Temporary ML-DSA PKI
OpenSSL created an ML-DSA-44 test CA plus ML-DSA-44 server and client certificates inside a temporary directory.
Post-quantum testing & deployment
Without breaking current hardware-attested credentials, C=US has deployed and measured post-quantum hybrid cryptography: from initial ML-DSA-44 mTLS experiments to an active, hybrid-only payout host (npi.agents.cequs.com:8443) and dual-signed transparency log tree heads.
npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 accepts only X25519MLKEM768; classical handshakes fail closed.Phase 1 · 8 October 2026
OpenSSL created an ML-DSA-44 test CA plus ML-DSA-44 server and client certificates inside a temporary directory.
The existing Python gateway ran on an ephemeral local port, verified the client chain, and bound its fingerprint to a synthetic directory entry.
A separate OpenSSL probe constrained the TLS 1.3 connection to X25519MLKEM768 and recorded the negotiated group and ML-DSA signatures.
Measured output · Phase 1
The OpenSSL negotiation transcript and the gateway application response come from two connections created by the same automated test. One connection verifies the application-level identity decision; the other records the explicitly constrained hybrid group.
Phase 2 · 27 October & 15 November 2026
Endpoints carrying Non-Public Information (NPI: consumer financial records and claims payouts under GLBA and HIPAA) are isolated on a dedicated host and port so that only post-quantum hybrid key exchange is accepted, without locking older or classical clients out of the primary gateway (agents.cequs.com).
On 27 October 2026, this virtual host was initially configured as a second name-based host on *:443. Testing revealed that clients offering only classical groups (X25519 or P-256) still completed the handshake. In Apache with OpenSSL, name-based virtual host selection via SNI occurs after OpenSSL initializes the handshake using the default virtual host's configuration (agents.cequs.com). Consequently, the NPI vhost’s SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Groups directive never took effect during early negotiation. The configuration was immediately disabled and moved to its own port: TCP 8443. As the exclusive virtual host on 8443, its post-quantum hybrid policy governs the connection from the very first handshake byte.
Defined in deploy/agent-gateway/npi.agents.cequs.com.conf:
The policy is continuously verified by security/agent-gateway/test_npi_pq.py (4 unit tests exercising hybrid acceptance, classical refusal, missing client certificate rejection, and port isolation). In addition, on 15 November 2026, a read-only live probe using OpenSSL 3.5.5 was executed against npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 (sending no client certificate or HTTP payload):
| TLS 1.3 Group Offered | Measured Probe Result | Security Meaning |
|---|---|---|
X25519MLKEM768 | Handshake completed (TLS 1.3)TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; server cert verified; group X25519MLKEM768. | Hybrid clients negotiate post-quantum forward secrecy against harvest-now-decrypt-later adversaries. |
X25519 only | Refused in handshake (Alert 40) OpenSSL alert number 40 (handshake failure). | Classical-only clients cannot connect to sensitive NPI endpoints. |
P-256 only | Refused in handshake (Alert 40) OpenSSL alert number 40 (handshake failure). | NIST classical curve handshakes fail closed. |
Deliberate boundary: The main gateway (agents.cequs.com:443) was not probed at the project lead’s direction. This page does not make assertions about what key exchange the main gateway currently accepts.
Phase 3 · 28 October 2026
In yubikey-mtls-demo/, the append-only certificate transparency log extends RFC 9162 to provide post-quantum tamper-evident guarantees:
Every tree head and inclusion promise is signed twice over the identical byte payload using classical Ed25519 and post-quantum ML-DSA-44 (FIPS 204).
The signature scheme identifier is embedded inside the signed payload; stripping the ML-DSA signature invalidates the Ed25519 signature as well.
A hybrid verifier requires both signatures to validate. Classical clients can verify the Ed25519 half under a backward-compatible policy.
Benchmark measurements on Node 24.14 with OpenSSL 3.5.5 demonstrate that signing a hybrid tree head takes 0.63 ms, and verification takes 0.26 ms (tested over 100,000 log leaves in tests/transparency-log.test.mjs).
System status
| Component / Protocol Layer | Cryptographic State | Technical Boundary / Current Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| Payout key exchange (port 8443) | Hybrid (X25519MLKEM768 only) | Live on npi.agents.cequs.com:8443. Rejects classical-only handshakes to prevent store-now-decrypt-later attacks. |
| Transparency log tree heads | Hybrid (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-44) | Project extension to RFC 9162. Verifier requires both classical and post-quantum signatures. |
| Local gateway ML-DSA verification | Tested (ML-DSA-44) | Proven in local testbed with synthetic agent directory bindings; not deployed to public trust anchors. |
| Agent client authentication | Classical (P-256) | Agent keys are stored in hardware YubiKeys and TPMs. Hardware security modules do not yet support on-chip ML-DSA signing. |
| Human supervisory passkeys | Classical (WebAuthn / FIDO2) | FIDO2 authenticators and Windows Hello utilize classical elliptic curves (P-256). |
| Gateway decision log signatures | Classical (Ed25519) | C=US operational evidence and gateway decision records are signed with classical Ed25519 keys. |
| Main gateway key exchange (port 443) | Not measured | agents.cequs.com:443 was deliberately not probed during live testing; policy is unasserted on this page. |
Cryptographic transition reality
A secure transition to post-quantum cryptography does not require moving all primitives simultaneously. In fact, doing so prematurely would weaken security by forcing private keys out of tamper-resistant hardware into unverified software implementations:
X25519MLKEM768 immediately neutralizes adversaries recording encrypted traffic today to decrypt with future quantum computers ("harvest now, decrypt later").Current position: Hardware-attested P-256 identities remain the authoritative authentication anchor. Post-quantum protection is enforced at the network transport layer (hybrid ML-KEM) and transparency layer (dual ML-DSA tree heads). This staged transition directly mirrors the federal milestones established in Executive Order 14412, which mandates key establishment migration by 2030 while extending the digital signature migration timeline to 2031.
Federal policy alignment
On 22 June 2026, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (91 FR 121). The order establishes federal policy to defend against “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) adversaries intercepting and storing encrypted United States communications to decrypt once quantum computers mature.
Crucially, Executive Order 14412 establishes a two-tiered compliance deadline that validates C=US’s architectural decision to migrate network key exchange immediately while retaining hardware-attested classical signatures:
NIST officially publishes FIPS 203 (ML-KEM for key encapsulation), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA for digital signatures), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), establishing the mathematical basis for post-quantum interoperability.
Signed into law, mandating that federal agencies and covered contractors transition high-impact information systems and High-Value Assets (HVAs) to NIST-approved post-quantum algorithms. The order directs agencies to appoint PQC Migration Leads and inventory all public-key cryptographic assets.
In automated testing with OpenSSL 3.5.7, C=US creates a disposable ML-DSA-44 test CA and client certificates. The Python policy gateway successfully authenticates the ML-DSA-44 chain and binds the certificate fingerprint in synthetic directory storage.
After observing that Apache SNI fallback on port 443 permitted classical ciphers, C=US isolates financial payout traffic to npi.agents.cequs.com:8443. The dedicated port enforces X25519MLKEM768 exclusively, closing the HNDL window for sensitive consumer financial data.
C=US extends RFC 9162 certificate transparency with dual classical and post-quantum signatures over tree heads and inclusion promises, preventing quantum forgery of historical audit trails.
An independent read-only TLS probe using OpenSSL 3.5.5 confirms that npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 completes handshakes for X25519MLKEM768 clients and rejects classical X25519 and P-256 handshakes with Alert 40.
The initial interagency pilot mandated under EO 14412 concludes, assessing early transition patterns for software-negotiated key encapsulation and hybrid TLS across federal environments.
Executive Order 14412 deadline: Federal agencies and covered federal contractors (via FAR Council rules) must transition all high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum key establishment. C=US’s hybrid ML-KEM enforcement on port 8443 conforms to this requirement today.
Executive Order 14412 deadline: Federal systems complete the migration to post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA / SLH-DSA). The staggered deadline provides the necessary runway for hardware token manufacturers (YubiKey, TPM, Secure Enclave) to deliver certified on-chip lattice signing without forcing private keys into vulnerable software memory.
Reproduction and attribution
Automated verification tests are maintained in the repository:
Tool Attribution per AGENTS.md:
ssl module and OpenSSL produced the substantive cryptographic and handshake results. No Claude comparison was used for Phase 1.npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 and authored the post-quantum handoff synthesis. Antigravity (Google DeepMind, Gemini Pro) integrated the findings, authored the updated page structure, integrated the Executive Order 14412 migration timeline, and verified the publication pipeline.All results represent developmental testbed evidence and proposed architecture, not student analysis, commercial endorsements, or production security certifications.
Standards and product context