Development evidence · Tested 8 October and 15 November 2026 · See Disclaimers
C=US · Control Plane Notes
Cryptographic migration evidence

Post-quantum testing & deployment

The gateway passed readiness tests; payouts enforce hybrid key exchange.

Without breaking current hardware-attested credentials, C=US has deployed and measured post-quantum hybrid cryptography: from initial ML-DSA-44 mTLS experiments to an active, hybrid-only payout host (npi.agents.cequs.com:8443) and dual-signed transparency log tree heads.

Readiness test: passed (8 Oct)The local gateway accepted ML-DSA-44 client certificates and bound fingerprints in the directory.
Payout host: enforced (15 Nov)npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 accepts only X25519MLKEM768; classical handshakes fail closed.

Phase 1 · 8 October 2026

A disposable test path around the unchanged gateway

01 · CREATE

Temporary ML-DSA PKI

OpenSSL created an ML-DSA-44 test CA plus ML-DSA-44 server and client certificates inside a temporary directory.

02 · AUTHENTICATE

Real gateway policy

The existing Python gateway ran on an ephemeral local port, verified the client chain, and bound its fingerprint to a synthetic directory entry.

03 · NEGOTIATE

Hybrid key agreement

A separate OpenSSL probe constrained the TLS 1.3 connection to X25519MLKEM768 and recorded the negotiated group and ML-DSA signatures.

Measured output · Phase 1

What the tools reported on 8 October 2026

Python runtime: 3.14.7 Python TLS library: OpenSSL 3.5.7 Certificate algorithm: ML-DSA-44 (CA, server and client) Protocol: TLSv1.3 Cipher suite: TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 Client signature type: mldsa44 Server signature type: mldsa44 Negotiated TLS 1.3 group: X25519MLKEM768 Certificate verification: OK Gateway /identity result: HTTP 200; certificate-binding rule applied PQ readiness test: 1 passed Existing gateway tests: 22 passed

The OpenSSL negotiation transcript and the gateway application response come from two connections created by the same automated test. One connection verifies the application-level identity decision; the other records the explicitly constrained hybrid group.

Phase 2 · 27 October & 15 November 2026

The hybrid-only payout host: npi.agents.cequs.com:8443

Endpoints carrying Non-Public Information (NPI: consumer financial records and claims payouts under GLBA and HIPAA) are isolated on a dedicated host and port so that only post-quantum hybrid key exchange is accepted, without locking older or classical clients out of the primary gateway (agents.cequs.com).

Why port 8443 had to be separate

On 27 October 2026, this virtual host was initially configured as a second name-based host on *:443. Testing revealed that clients offering only classical groups (X25519 or P-256) still completed the handshake. In Apache with OpenSSL, name-based virtual host selection via SNI occurs after OpenSSL initializes the handshake using the default virtual host's configuration (agents.cequs.com). Consequently, the NPI vhost’s SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Groups directive never took effect during early negotiation. The configuration was immediately disabled and moved to its own port: TCP 8443. As the exclusive virtual host on 8443, its post-quantum hybrid policy governs the connection from the very first handshake byte.

Policy configuration

Defined in deploy/agent-gateway/npi.agents.cequs.com.conf:

Listen 8443 <VirtualHost *:8443> ServerName npi.agents.cequs.com SSLProtocol -all +TLSv1.3 SSLOpenSSLConfCmd Groups X25519MLKEM768 SSLVerifyClient require ... </VirtualHost>

Empirical test suite & live TLS probe

The policy is continuously verified by security/agent-gateway/test_npi_pq.py (4 unit tests exercising hybrid acceptance, classical refusal, missing client certificate rejection, and port isolation). In addition, on 15 November 2026, a read-only live probe using OpenSSL 3.5.5 was executed against npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 (sending no client certificate or HTTP payload):

TLS 1.3 Group OfferedMeasured Probe ResultSecurity Meaning
X25519MLKEM768Handshake completed (TLS 1.3)
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384; server cert verified; group X25519MLKEM768.
Hybrid clients negotiate post-quantum forward secrecy against harvest-now-decrypt-later adversaries.
X25519 onlyRefused in handshake (Alert 40)
OpenSSL alert number 40 (handshake failure).
Classical-only clients cannot connect to sensitive NPI endpoints.
P-256 onlyRefused in handshake (Alert 40)
OpenSSL alert number 40 (handshake failure).
NIST classical curve handshakes fail closed.

Deliberate boundary: The main gateway (agents.cequs.com:443) was not probed at the project lead’s direction. This page does not make assertions about what key exchange the main gateway currently accepts.

Phase 3 · 28 October 2026

Hybrid transparency logging: dual-signed tree heads

In yubikey-mtls-demo/, the append-only certificate transparency log extends RFC 9162 to provide post-quantum tamper-evident guarantees:

01 · DUAL SIGN

Ed25519 + ML-DSA-44

Every tree head and inclusion promise is signed twice over the identical byte payload using classical Ed25519 and post-quantum ML-DSA-44 (FIPS 204).

02 · BIND SCHEME

Anti-stripping binding

The signature scheme identifier is embedded inside the signed payload; stripping the ML-DSA signature invalidates the Ed25519 signature as well.

03 · VERIFY

Hybrid verification policy

A hybrid verifier requires both signatures to validate. Classical clients can verify the Ed25519 half under a backward-compatible policy.

Benchmark measurements on Node 24.14 with OpenSSL 3.5.5 demonstrate that signing a hybrid tree head takes 0.63 ms, and verification takes 0.26 ms (tested over 100,000 log leaves in tests/transparency-log.test.mjs).

System status

What is post-quantum, and what is still classical

Component / Protocol LayerCryptographic StateTechnical Boundary / Current Rationale
Payout key exchange (port 8443)Hybrid (X25519MLKEM768 only)Live on npi.agents.cequs.com:8443. Rejects classical-only handshakes to prevent store-now-decrypt-later attacks.
Transparency log tree headsHybrid (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-44)Project extension to RFC 9162. Verifier requires both classical and post-quantum signatures.
Local gateway ML-DSA verificationTested (ML-DSA-44)Proven in local testbed with synthetic agent directory bindings; not deployed to public trust anchors.
Agent client authenticationClassical (P-256)Agent keys are stored in hardware YubiKeys and TPMs. Hardware security modules do not yet support on-chip ML-DSA signing.
Human supervisory passkeysClassical (WebAuthn / FIDO2)FIDO2 authenticators and Windows Hello utilize classical elliptic curves (P-256).
Gateway decision log signaturesClassical (Ed25519)C=US operational evidence and gateway decision records are signed with classical Ed25519 keys.
Main gateway key exchange (port 443)Not measuredagents.cequs.com:443 was deliberately not probed during live testing; policy is unasserted on this page.

Cryptographic transition reality

The hardware key invariant: why key exchange moved first

A secure transition to post-quantum cryptography does not require moving all primitives simultaneously. In fact, doing so prematurely would weaken security by forcing private keys out of tamper-resistant hardware into unverified software implementations:

Current position: Hardware-attested P-256 identities remain the authoritative authentication anchor. Post-quantum protection is enforced at the network transport layer (hybrid ML-KEM) and transparency layer (dual ML-DSA tree heads). This staged transition directly mirrors the federal milestones established in Executive Order 14412, which mandates key establishment migration by 2030 while extending the digital signature migration timeline to 2031.

Federal policy alignment

Executive Order 14412: The post-quantum migration timeline

On 22 June 2026, President Donald J. Trump issued Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks (91 FR 121). The order establishes federal policy to defend against “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” (HNDL) adversaries intercepting and storing encrypted United States communications to decrypt once quantum computers mature.

Crucially, Executive Order 14412 establishes a two-tiered compliance deadline that validates C=US’s architectural decision to migrate network key exchange immediately while retaining hardware-attested classical signatures:

  1. 13 August 2024 · Mathematical Foundation NIST releases final post-quantum cryptographic standards

    NIST officially publishes FIPS 203 (ML-KEM for key encapsulation), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA for digital signatures), and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), establishing the mathematical basis for post-quantum interoperability.

  2. 22 June 2026 · Federal Directive EO 14412 Executive Order 14412 issued by the President

    Signed into law, mandating that federal agencies and covered contractors transition high-impact information systems and High-Value Assets (HVAs) to NIST-approved post-quantum algorithms. The order directs agencies to appoint PQC Migration Leads and inventory all public-key cryptographic assets.

  3. 8 October 2026 · C=US Phase 1 Tested Local gateway ML-DSA-44 readiness test

    In automated testing with OpenSSL 3.5.7, C=US creates a disposable ML-DSA-44 test CA and client certificates. The Python policy gateway successfully authenticates the ML-DSA-44 chain and binds the certificate fingerprint in synthetic directory storage.

  4. 27 October 2026 · C=US Phase 2 Deployed Dedicated payout port 8443 enforces hybrid key exchange

    After observing that Apache SNI fallback on port 443 permitted classical ciphers, C=US isolates financial payout traffic to npi.agents.cequs.com:8443. The dedicated port enforces X25519MLKEM768 exclusively, closing the HNDL window for sensitive consumer financial data.

  5. 28 October 2026 · C=US Phase 3 Deployed Dual-signed transparency log (Ed25519 + ML-DSA-44)

    C=US extends RFC 9162 certificate transparency with dual classical and post-quantum signatures over tree heads and inclusion promises, preventing quantum forgery of historical audit trails.

  6. 15 November 2026 · C=US Phase 4 Verified Live TLS probe confirms fail-closed policy on port 8443

    An independent read-only TLS probe using OpenSSL 3.5.5 confirms that npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 completes handshakes for X25519MLKEM768 clients and rejects classical X25519 and P-256 handshakes with Alert 40.

  7. 31 December 2027 · Federal Pilot Milestone Department of Commerce PQC migration pilot concludes

    The initial interagency pilot mandated under EO 14412 concludes, assessing early transition patterns for software-negotiated key encapsulation and hybrid TLS across federal environments.

  8. 31 December 2030 · Federal Deadline EO 14412 Stage 1 Mandatory transition of key establishment for HVAs and federal contractors

    Executive Order 14412 deadline: Federal agencies and covered federal contractors (via FAR Council rules) must transition all high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum key establishment. C=US’s hybrid ML-KEM enforcement on port 8443 conforms to this requirement today.

  9. 31 December 2031 · Federal Deadline EO 14412 Stage 2 Mandatory transition of digital signatures and authentication

    Executive Order 14412 deadline: Federal systems complete the migration to post-quantum digital signatures (ML-DSA / SLH-DSA). The staggered deadline provides the necessary runway for hardware token manufacturers (YubiKey, TPM, Secure Enclave) to deliver certified on-chip lattice signing without forcing private keys into vulnerable software memory.

Reproduction and attribution

Evidence that can be rerun & tool accountability

Automated verification tests are maintained in the repository:

# 1. Local gateway ML-DSA readiness test (Phase 1) $env:OPENSSL='C:\Program Files\OpenSSL-Win64\bin\openssl.exe'; $env:REQUIRE_PQ_READINESS='1' py -3.14 -m unittest security/mtls/test_pq_readiness.py -v # 2. Payout vhost hybrid policy and port isolation tests (Phase 2) python -m unittest security/agent-gateway/test_npi_pq.py -v # 3. Live TLS probe against npi host (read-only, no client cert) openssl s_client -connect npi.agents.cequs.com:8443 -servername npi.agents.cequs.com -tls1_3 -groups X25519MLKEM768 -brief

Tool Attribution per AGENTS.md:

All results represent developmental testbed evidence and proposed architecture, not student analysis, commercial endorsements, or production security certifications.

Standards and product context

Primary references